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As this very fine conference demonstrates, American law-and-
religion scholarship has begun to expand its focus beyond the tradi-
tional study of church-state relations to an examination of religious 
law itself.  Much of the new scholarship is comparative, addressing 
law’s place in different religious traditions.
1
  Yet scholars have neg-
lected one important topic.  Although American scholarship has be-
gun to address both Christian and Islamic jurisprudence in a serious 
way,
2
 virtually none of the literature attempts to compare the place of 
law in these two world religions. 
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 1 See, e.g., RELIGION, LAW AND TRADITION: COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN RELIGIOUS LAW 
(Andrew Huxley ed., 2002); Harold J. Berman, Comparative Law and Religion, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 739 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zim-
mermann eds., 2006); Chaim Saiman, Jesus’ Legal Theory—A Rabbinic Reading, 23 J.L. 
& RELIGION 97 (2007); Symposium, Text, Tradition, and Reason in Comparative Perspec-
tive, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2006). 
 2 On Christian jurisprudence, see, for example, CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON 
LEGAL THOUGHT (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001); CHRISTIANITY AND LAW: AN 
INTRODUCTION (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2008); THE TEACHINGS OF 
MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE (John Witte Jr. & Frank 
S. Alexander eds., 2006).  On Islamic jurisprudence, see, for example, ABDULLAHI 
AHMED AN-NA‘IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE (2008); Lama Abu-Odeh, The Politics 
of (Mis)recognition: Islamic Law Pedagogy in American Academia, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 789 
(2004); Khaled Abou El Fadl, Muslim Minorities and Self-Restraint in Liberal Democracies, 
29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1525 (1996); Haider Ala Hamoudi, Baghdad Booksellers, Basra Car-
pet Merchants, and the Law of God and Man: Legal Pluralism and the Contemporary Muslim 
Experience, 1 BERKELEY J. MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC L. 83 (2008); Ali Khan, The Reopening of 
the Islamic Code: The Second Era of Ijtihad, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 341 (2003); Asifa Qurai-
shi, Interpreting the Qur’an and the Constitution: Similarities in the Use of Text, Tradition, 
and Reason in Islamic and American Jurisprudence, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 67 (2006); Kris-
ten A. Stilt, Islamic Law and the Making and Remaking of the Iraqi Legal System, 36 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 695 (2004).  
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This Essay begins to compare Islamic and Christian conceptions 
of law and suggests some implications for contemporary debates 
about religious dispute settlement.  One must approach this project 
with humility, especially in a short piece.  Islam and Christianity are 
subtle and complex religions.  Each has competing strands; each has 
evolved over millennia and expressed itself differently over time.  
Moreover, although systematic treatments of Islamic law are begin-
ning to appear in English,
3
 much remains available only in languages, 
like Arabic, that are unfortunately inaccessible to most American 
scholars. 
Notwithstanding these complexities, some generalizations are 
possible.  Both Islam and Christianity spring from faith, but the two 
religions express faith differently—and the difference relates to law.  
In Islam, a comprehensive body of law sacralizes daily life and con-
nects believers to God.
4
  Islam’s primary discourse, fiqh, or “jurispru-
dence,” attempts to derive that law from scriptural sources.
5
  Islam’s 
clergy, the ulama, or “learned”—often translated as “jurists”—are ex-
perts in that law.
6
  In fact, many scholars maintain that nothing ex-
ceeds law’s importance in the life of Islam.  A generation ago, the 
Orientalist Joseph Schacht famously asserted that law constitutes Is-
lam’s “core and kernel”;
7
 more recently, Wael Hallaq has written that 
“law has been so successfully developed in Islam that it would not be 
an exaggeration to characterize Islamic culture as a legal culture.”
8
  
One should not “overlegalize” Islam,
9
 which values commitment to 
God rather than routine rule following.
10
  Nonetheless, a comprehen-
sive religious law system, one that guides believers in their daily activi-
ties, has been a crucial part of the Muslim experience. 
By contrast, Christianity does not express its faith through a 
body of law.  Christianity’s traditional discourse is theology, a reflec-
 
 3 See, e.g., MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE (3d 
ed. 2003).   
 4 See MALISE RUTHVEN, ISLAM IN THE WORLD 181 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing Sunni 
Islam). 
 5 See F.E. PETERS, ISLAM: A GUIDE FOR JEWS AND CHRISTIANS 174 (2003) (defining 
fiqh). 
 6 Id.; see also RUTHVEN, supra note 4, at 129 (“scholar-jurists”). 
 7 JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 1 (1964). 
 8 WAEL B. HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES 209 (1997). 
 9 MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, SHARI‘AH LAW 1 (2008). 
 10 See DANIEL BROWN, A NEW INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM 127 (2004); JOHN L. 
ESPOSITO, ISLAM: THE STRAIGHT PATH 68 (3d ed. 1998). 
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tion on God’s nature, not His will.
11
  Its clergy are sacramental minis-
ters, not legal scholars.
12
  This is not to say that Christianity embraces 
antinomianism or lacks interest in ethical behavior.  On the contrary, 
most contemporary churches have some form of canon law,
13
 and 
Christian jurisprudence exists.
14
  But law lacks the significance in 
Christianity that it has in Islam.  Unlike fiqh, canon law serves an aux-
iliary function in the life of Christianity; it is facilitative, not constitu-
tive, of the believer’s relationship with God.
15
  Unlike fiqh, it has a fair-
ly limited scope.  And, unlike fiqh, Christian jurisprudence is not 
exegetical.  Compared with Islam, as many scholars note, Christianity 
focuses more on orthodoxy than orthopraxy, on correct doctrine ra-
ther than correct practice.
16
 
The different emphasis that Islam and Christianity place on reli-
gious law is reflected in contemporary attitudes toward religious tri-
bunals.  In some Western societies, Muslim organizations have called 
for Islamic tribunals to resolve family and commercial disputes 
among consenting Muslims.  According to proponents, such tribunals 
are necessary for Muslims in Western societies—so-called “minority” 
Muslims
17
—to “‘live our faith to the best of our ability.’”
18
  Not all 
“minority” Muslims agree; the proposals have created tensions within 
Muslim communities as well as with non-Muslims.
19
  The fact that 
many Muslims believe that their faith requires them to resolve family 
 
 11 See ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 68. 
 12 See PETERS, supra note 5, at 176. 
 13 For an introduction to contemporary canon law, see Norman Doe, Modern 
Church Law, in CHRISTIANITY AND LAW: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 2, at 271.   
 14 For a sourcebook on Christian jurisprudence, see FROM IRENAEUS TO GROTIUS: 
A SOURCEBOOK IN CHRISTIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (Oliver O’Donovan & Joan Lock-
wood O’Donovan eds., 1999).  
 15 See infra text accompanying notes 145-51. 
 16 ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 68; RUTHVEN, supra note 4, at 354. 
 17 Cf. TARIQ RAMADAN, RADICAL REFORM 31 (2009) (discussing the “‘minority fiqh’” 
that some scholars have formulated for “Muslims living in a ‘minority situation,’ par-
ticularly in the West”).  
 18 Ayelet Shachar, Privatizing Diversity: A Cautionary Tale from Religious Arbitration in 
Family Law, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 573, 585 (2008) (quoting Interview by Rabia 
Mills with Syed Mumtaz Ali, President, Can. Soc’y of Muslims (Aug. 1995), available at 
http://muslim-canada.org/pfl.htm).  
 19 See, e.g., Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, The Compatibility Dialectic: Mediating the 
Legitimate Coexistence of Islamic Law and State Law, 73 MOD. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (2010) (ar-
guing against Islamic arbitration).  For more on some Muslims’ objections to Islamic 
arbitration, see infra note 186 and accompanying text.  
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and commercial disputes in Islamic tribunals, however, demonstrates 
the importance that religious law has in contemporary Muslim life. 
By contrast, a desire for religious tribunals does not loom large 
for contemporary Christians.  True, some Christian organizations of-
fer “Christian arbitration” services, and church tribunals resolve dis-
putes about church structure and discipline.
20
  But these phenomena 
differ from their Islamic counterparts.  Although hard statistics are 
unavailable, it does not appear that many Christians wish to resolve 
legal questions in religious tribunals; most see civil litigation as an ac-
ceptable dispute settlement mechanism.
21
  Moreover, even if Chris-
tians wished to settle their disputes under religious law, contempo-
rary Christianity does not provide one for them to use.  For example, 
the current Code of Canon Law of the Catholic Church belies any 
notion of a general Christian substantive law.  “In respect to most le-
gal matters regulated by civil law,” the Code “says nothing.”
22
  Similar-
ly, “Christian arbitration” tends to involve general ethical principles 
rather than legal doctrine.
23
 
To be sure, factors beyond internal religious dynamics also help 
explain why contemporary Muslims and Christians value religious law 
differently.  The Enlightenment has had a secularizing effect on 
Western society and made Christianity a more private phenomenon 
than it once was.
24
  Islam may similarly evolve; indeed, some argue 
that the transformation already has begun.  And the desire of some 
Western Muslims for Islamic tribunals may reflect an assertion of 
community identity more than religious commitment.  I discuss these 
factors below.  One should not dismiss internal religious dynamics, 
however.  Comparatively speaking, law figures more prominently in 
the life of Islam than Christianity, and this difference surely influ-
ences how Muslims and Christians view religious tribunals today. 
Before going further, I should clarify the way I use three impor-
tant terms.  By “Islam,” I mean the classical Sunni tradition.  Some 
 
 20 On Christian arbitration, see Michael C. Grossman, Note, Is This Arbitration?: 
Religious Tribunals, Judicial Review, and Due Process, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 177–78 
(2007).  For a recent case enforcing a Christian arbitration agreement, see Easterly v. 
Heritage Christian Sch., No. 1:08-CV-1714-WTL-TAB, 2009 WL 2750099 (S.D. Ind. 
Aug. 26, 2009). 
 21 See Thomas J. Paprocki, Methods of Avoiding Trials, in NEW COMMENTARY ON THE 
CODE OF CANON LAW 1803, 1803–04 (John P. Beal et al. eds., 2000). 
 22 John M. Huels, Introduction, in NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW, 
supra note 21, at 47, 85. 
 23 See infra text accompanying notes 189-94. 
 24 See MARK LILLA, THE STILLBORN GOD 57–58 (2007). 
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may quarrel with this decision.  To focus on classical Sunni Islam is to 
exclude other important currents like Shia Islam and Sufi mysticism.  
Moreover, some commentators maintain that the classical model is 
“too theoretical” to justify scholarly emphasis.
25
  For example, Haider 
Hamoudi cautions that, by focusing on classical Islam, one risks be-
coming an expert in an abstraction that has little to do with how law 
actually operates in Muslim countries.
26
  And some contemporary 
Muslims are rethinking the classical model and developing new ways 
of following Islam in the Western world.
27
 
Notwithstanding these criticisms, a focus on classical Sunni Islam 
seems justified.  Roughly ninety percent of contemporary Muslims are 
Sunni,
28
 and classical Sunni Islam remains the overwhelming focus of 
mainstream Islamic law scholarship.
29
  Scholars like Hamoudi may be 
correct when they advocate change in Islamic legal scholarship, but, 
for an outsider seeking to engage the material, the mainstream posi-
tion seems a safe place to begin.  Moreover, “a substantial number of 
Muslims derive, and for the foreseeable future will continue to derive, 
their normative understandings of Islam from historical conceptions 
of Islamic orthodoxy.”
30
  Classical Islam thus represents an important 
empirical phenomenon that scholars must engage if they wish to un-
derstand the background for contemporary Muslim thought. 
Like Islam, “Christianity” encompasses different traditions.  The 
Catholic view of law differs from the Protestant and the Orthodox.  
Moreover, Christian traditions have adopted different positions at dif-
ferent times; one cannot reduce millennia of reflection to a single 
formula.  One must start somewhere, though.  When I discuss Chris-
tianity, I mean what some scholars call the “great tradition,” defined 
by the Bible, the apostolic tradition, and the first ecumenical coun-
cils.
31
  Most mainstream Christians accept the legitimacy of these 
 
 25 Mohammad Fadel, Islamic Politics and Secular Politics: Can They Co-Exist?, 25 J.L. 
& RELIGION 187, 190 (2009) (discussing this criticism). 
 26 See Hamoudi, supra note 2, at 83–84. 
 27 See infra text accompanying notes 198–212. 
 28 See PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, MAPPING THE GLOBAL MUSLIM 
POPULATION: A REPORT ON THE SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORLD’S MUSLIM 
POPULATION 1 (2009), available at http://www.pewforum.org/uploadedfiles/ 
Orphan_Migrated_Content/Muslimpopulation.pdf. 
 29 See Hamoudi, supra note 2, at 83–84. 
 30 Fadel, supra note 25, at 190 (stating author’s assumption). 
 31 See James S. Cutsinger, Introduction: Finding the Center, in RECLAIMING THE GREAT 
TRADITION: EVANGELICALS, CATHOLICS & ORTHODOX IN DIALOGUE 7, 7–10 (James S. 
Cutsinger ed., 1997); see also J.I. Packer, On from Orr: Cultural Crisis, Rational Realism 
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sources, even if they disagree about particulars.  As Witte and Alex-
ander observe, “there is more confluence than conflict in Catholic, 
Protestant, and Orthodox understandings of law,” particularly if one 
takes the “long and responsible historical perspective.”
32
 
“Law,” too, is a vague term that covers many discrete concepts re-
levant here, including canon, divine, Islamic, Jewish, and natural law.  
I cannot treat these categories in detail, nor, I think, is it necessary to 
do so.  I will distinguish among them where important to avoid con-
fusion.  The key point is this: When I say that Islam values law in a way 
Christianity does not, I mean that Islam has thought it vital to develop 
a comprehensive legal system to guide believers’ daily lives.  Classical 
fiqh covers topics most readers would think of as spiritual, like prayer 
and fasting, as well as those most readers would think of as temporal, 
like commerce and inheritance.
33
  Apart from medieval Catholicism, 
perhaps, Christianity has never had such a system, and no Christian 
tradition has one today. 
One sort of law that I will not discuss much here is state law.  Is-
lam and Christianity both have reflected on state law and the stance 
that believers should take toward it.  I leave that important and com-
plicated subject for another occasion.  My interest here is law in reli-
gion, not religion in law.  I address how law figures in the relationship 
between believers and God, not between believers and the political 
authorities. 
Finally, I should note that my interest relates to Islam and Chris-
tianity as empirical phenomena.  They also represent much more 
than that.  I do not, however, address the religions’ truth claims here, 
nor do I attempt to evaluate their respective approaches to law.  I at-
tempt instead to offer tentative views on a difference that lurks in the 
background of Muslim-Christian interactions, one that already has 
contributed to controversy in two Western democracies.  Before Mus-
lims and Christians can negotiate this difference, they must under-
stand it.  I hope this Essay contributes to that important endeavor and 
to the growing body of work in comparative religious law. 
 
& Incarnational Ontology, in RECLAIMING THE GREAT TRADITION: EVANGELICALS, 
CATHOLICS & ORTHODOX IN DIALOGUE, supra, at 154, 156–57 (describing content of 
“the great tradition of Christian faith and life”). 
 32 John Witte Jr. & Frank S. Alexander, Introduction to 1 THE TEACHINGS OF 
MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE, supra note 2, at xxi, 
xxxv. 
 33 See KAMALI, supra note 9, at 42. 
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*  *  * 
As Tariq Ramadan observes, “[t]he first and most important 
element of Muslim identity is faith.”
34
  The Muslim is one who be-
lieves and puts his trust in God, who submits to God’s will, as God has 
revealed that will in the witness of the Prophet Muhammad.
35
  Unlike 
Christianity, however, Islam has not attempted to express its faith by 
reflecting systematically on God’s nature.
36
  Islam has focused most of 
its intellectual energy on jurisprudence, an attempt to understand 
God’s will, not His nature, and to actualize that will in a system of 
law.
37
 
Islam teaches that God revealed His final law for humanity—the 
Sharia, a word which in Arabic means “way to the watering-place”
38
—
in two sources.  The Quran, or “Recitation,” is a collection of roughly 
6200 verses (ayat) that Muslims believe God communicated to Mu-
hammad, through the intercession of the angel Gabriel, over a span 
of roughly two decades beginning in the year 610.
39
  The revelations 
came during two discrete periods in Muhammad’s life, the first in 
Mecca, where he struggled against a largely hostile political and reli-
gious establishment, and then in Medina, where he emigrated to 
form the new Muslim community, or umma.
40
  The verses appear in 
more than 100 chapters (suras), arranged in terms of length, from 
longest to shortest.
41
  In contrast to Christians, who see the Bible as 
divinely inspired, Muslims believe that the Quran is literally the word 
of God, an inimitable miracle, “perfect, eternal, and unchangeable.”
42
 
Less than ten percent of the Quran concerns law.
43
  Yet, as Hal-
laq observes, the legal ayat “represent a larger weight than [their] 
 
 34 TARIQ RAMADAN, WESTERN MUSLIMS AND THE FUTURE OF ISLAM 79 (2004) (em-
phasis omitted); see also KAMALI, supra note 9, at 5 (“Islam is a faith and a moral code 
first and foremost; it stands on its own five pillars, and following a legal code is rela-
tive and subsidiary to the original call and message of Islam.”). 
 35 See RUTHVEN, supra note 4, at 108. 
 36 See RAMADAN, supra note 34, at 11–12 (arguing that Islam does not have a 
“‘theology,’” in Christian terms).     
 37 See ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 68–69. 
 38 KAMALI, supra note 9, at 2.  
 39 See KAMALI, supra note 3, at 16–17; PETERS, supra note 5, at 99, 101.  
 40 On Meccan and Medinan suras, see PETERS, supra note 5, at 99.  On the found-
ing of the umma in Medina, see id. at 128. 
 41 KAMALI, supra note 3, at 17. 
 42 ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 19. 
 43 KAMALI, supra note 3, at 25.  
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number may indicate.”
44
  Unlike the nonlegal verses, the legal verses 
tend not to repeat, and their average length is two or three times that 
of the nonlegal verses.
45
  Thus, while one should not perceive the Qu-
ran as a code, its legal elements are quite important.  The Quran pre-
scribes rules regarding both worship (ibadat) and “civil transactions” 
(mu‘amalat).
46
  The latter category covers many subjects that contem-
porary Western readers would think of as secular, like family law, in-
cluding “marriage, divorce, paternity, custody of children, mainten-
ance, inheritance and bequests”; “commercial transactions, such as 
sale, lease, loan, and mortgage”; and “crimes . . . such as murder, 
highway robbery, theft, adultery, and slanderous accusation.”
47
 
The Sharia’s second source is the Sunna, or practices of the 
Prophet—his words and deeds, the judgments he rendered, the con-
duct he allowed and the conduct he forbade.
48
  The Sunna appears in 
“tradition reports,” or hadiths, that recount episodes in the Prophet’s 
life.
49
  Many such reports circulated after Muhammad’s death in 632; 
in the ninth and tenth centuries, Muslim scholars sifted and com-
piled them into authoritative versions.
50
  Unlike in the Quran, legal 
materials predominate.
51
  Although it binds believers, the Sunna must 
be read consistently with the Quran, and, in case of clear conflict, the 
latter controls.
52
 
Because it often speaks in general terms, especially with respect 
to mu‘amalat, the Sharia does not always provide believers clear guid-
ance.
53
  Fiqh evolved as a way to make the Sharia operational.  The sys-
tematization “took place in the second and third centuries of Islam,” 
starting around 750.
54
  The ulama derived fiqh through an exegetical 
 
 44 WAEL B. HALLAQ, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC LAW 21 (2005).  
 45 Id.  
 46 See KAMALI, supra note 3, at 26 (discussing Quranic rules); KAMALI, supra note 9, 
at 17 (defining these terms).   
 47 KAMALI, supra note 9, at 19. 
 48 See ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 80. 
 49 See id.  Scholars often use the terms Sunna and hadith interchangeably.  See 
KAMALI, supra note 3, at 61–62. 
 50 ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 80–81.    
 51 See KNUT VIKØR, BETWEEN GOD AND THE SULTAN: A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 45 
(2005). 
 52 KAMALI, supra note 3, at 79. 
 53 See KAMALI, supra note 9, at 50. 
 54 AN-NA‘IM, supra note 2, at 14. 
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process called ijtihad, a word that means “striving or exertion.”
55
  
Faced with a situation the Sharia did not expressly cover, the jurists 
would search for a similar case and determine its “cause,” or ‘illa.
56
  
Having done so, they would see whether the ‘illa could extend by 
analogy—qiyas—to the new case.
57
  For someone trained in common 
law reasoning, this process is very familiar: one discovers the ratio de-
cendi of a case and determines whether it applies in new circums-
tances.
58
 
Ijtihad is quintessentially a religious exercise, a way of relating to 
the divine.
59
  The Legislator, in Islamic legal theory, is God; the jurist 
simply seeks, as best he can, to infer God’s will from revelation.
60
  Is-
lam does not admit the concept of natural law in the Christian 
sense.
61
  Early on, the ulama rejected the idea that human beings 
could discern good and evil, and thus the requirements of God’s law, 
through speculative reason.
62
  That view, associated with a ninth-
century school known as the Mutazalites, seemed to impinge on 
God’s sovereignty.
63
  Mainstream fiqh adopted the position of the Mu-
tazalites’ opponents, the Asharites, who argued that God’s will, not 
human reason, determines what is good or bad, lawful or unlawful.
64
  
Thus, while reason plays an important role in Islamic law, its purpose 
remains circumscribed.  The jurist who engages in ijtihad does not 
seek principally the rule that seems to him most beneficial or just.
65
  
He does not even attempt to understand the ultimate intent of God, 
 
 55 KAMALI, supra note 9, at 162; see also PETERS, supra note 5, at 180–81 (“‘personal 
initiative’”). 
 56 BERNARD G. WEISS, THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC LAW 67 (1998).   
 57 For an excellent discussion of this process, see KAMALI, supra note 3, at 264–
305.  
 58 See Wael B. Hallaq, Legal Reasoning in Islamic Law and the Common Law: Logic and 
Method, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 79, 86 (1985–86). 
 59 Cf. AN-NA‘IM, supra note 2, at 15 (“The essentially religious nature of Shari‘a 
and its focus on regulating the relationship between God and human believers mean 
that believers can neither abdicate nor delegate their responsibility [for ijtihad].”).  
 60 See KAMALI, supra note 3, at 440–41.    
 61 See RÉMI BRAGUE, THE LAW OF GOD 160 (Lydia G. Cochrane trans., 2007); 
RUTHVEN, supra note 4, at 149–51. 
 62 This is not to say that Islam rejects speculative reason entirely.  See infra text ac-
companying note158. 
 63 See RUTHVEN, supra note 4, at 149.  
 64 See id.; BRAGUE, supra note 61, at 165–67.  See generally KAMALI, supra note 3, at 
441–45 (discussing three different views that ulama have held regarding reason and 
revelation). 
 65 See WEISS, supra note 56, at 37. 
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which remains unknowable.
66
  Rather, he seeks to discover, through 
reason, the rule that the Lawgiver has commanded.
67
 
The ulama recognized that jurists conducting ijtihad could reach 
different conclusions.  Over time, though, jurists might be able to 
reach consensus, or ijma, on a point of fiqh.
68
  Once formed, consen-
sus precluded further ijtihad.
69
  Indeed, “[b]y the beginning of the 
tenth century,” the ulama had concluded that ijma had been reached 
on all the essential points of fiqh.
70
  The “door of ijtihad” had closed; 
from then on, jurists were not to derive new rules, but simply “study 
the established legal manuals and write their commentaries.”
71
  To do 
otherwise would be to engage in unjustified innovation (bida), an ac-
cusation “equivalent to the charge of heresy in Christianity.”
72
  Not all 
ulama have agreed, then or now, but “the closing of the door” re-
mains a powerful concept in mainstream Islam.
73
 
One should not see fiqh as “monolithic,” however.
74
  Islam has 
had various schools of jurisprudence (madhabs) over the course of its 
history, four of which remain today in Sunni Islam: the Hanafi, Sha-
fi‘i, Maliki, and Hanbali madhabs, all named for the jurists who 
founded them.
75
  Traditionally, they have dominated in different 
geographical regions.
76
  The madhabs disagree on some substantive 
and methodological questions, including the correct interpretation 
of parts of the Sharia and the proper role of reason, judicial prefe-
rence (istihsan), and public interest (istislah) in legal analysis.
77
  In 
 
 66 See BRAGUE, supra note 61, at 183-84 (discussing work of Ghazali). 
 67 See KAMALI, supra note 3, at 440–41. 
 68 See ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 82–83. 
 69 See DAVID WAINES, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM 83 (2d ed. 2003). 
 70 KAMALI, supra note 9, at 94. 
 71 ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 84; see also RUTHVEN, supra note 4, at 142–44. 
 72 ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 84; see also JONATHAN P. BERKEY, THE FORMATION OF 
ISLAM: RELIGION AND SOCIETY IN THE NEAR EAST, 600–1800, at 147 (2003) (“To go 
against the consensus was, in a very real sense, to step outside the tradition, to be-
come in fact a heretic.”). 
 73 See ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 226–29 (discussing Muslim traditionalism); 
KAMALI, supra note 3, at 490 (“With the exception of the Hanbalis, who maintain that 
ijtihad in all of its forms remains open, the ulama of the other three schools have on 
the whole acceded to the view that independent ijtihad has discontinued.”).  For a 
recent call for “a second era of ijtihad,” see Khan, supra note 2. 
 74 KAMALI, supra note 9, at 92. 
 75 See WAINES, supra note 69, at 65–71; Stilt, supra note 2, at 721. 
 76 KAMALI, supra note 9, at 73 (contrasting regional distribution of Hanafi and 
Maliki madhabs). 
 77 Id. at 93–94. 
MOVSESIAN (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/28/2010  2:04 PM 
2010] FIQH AND CANONS 871 
 
principle, though, each Sunni school accepts the others as legitimate, 
and Muslims need not adhere exclusively to any madhab.  Nowadays, 
“[a] Muslim may join any orthodox school he or she wishes, or 
change from one school to another, without formalities.”
78
 
Law has had a more ambivalent place in Christianity.  Christiani-
ty started as a movement within Judaism; the Gospels record that Je-
sus was a rabbi, a teacher of Jewish law, or Torah.
79
  Very early, 
though, in apostolic times, Christianity rejected what it saw as Ju-
daism’s legalism, especially the style of close legal reasoning that cha-
racterized the Pharisaic tradition that was becoming Judaism’s domi-
nant expression.
80
  The Gospels portray Jesus as denouncing religious 
lawyers for focusing on technicalities and neglecting “the weightier 
matters of the law: justice and mercy and faith.”
81
  In particular, Chris-
tians rejected what they characterized as ceremonial practices, such as 
dietary rules and circumcision.
82
  The Pauline epistles portray such 
rules as distracting from the more spiritual worship God desires.
83
 
Christianity did not reject law entirely, though.  The early Chris-
tians drew a distinction between the ceremonial aspects of Torah and 
what they perceived as its moral content—the Ten Commandments, 
for example.
84
  The moral law survived; in fact, Paul argued, it was ac-
cessible to human reason as a kind of natural law.
85
  Christians taught 
that the moral law had achieved perfection in Christ’s example of 
piety and sacrifice, in the values He had proclaimed in the Sermon 
on the Mount, particularly the Beatitudes (“Blessed are those who 
hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they will be filled.  Blessed 
are the merciful, for they will receive mercy.”).
86
  This is what the ear-
 
 78 Id. at 94; Stilt, supra note 2, at 721 (“Historically, school affiliation among Sun-
nis was more important than it tends to be today.”). 
 79 See, e.g., John 1:38; see also Luke Timothy Johnson, Law in Early Christianity, in 
CHRISTIANITY AND LAW: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 2, at 53, 57. 
 80 See Johnson, supra note 79, at 56 (discussing ascendance of Pharisaic Judaism 
after 70 A.D.). 
 81 Matthew 23:23. 
 82 See Johnson, supra note 79, at 63.  
 83 See, e.g., Galatians 5:6; Romans 14:1–6. 
 84 See Johnson, supra note 79, at 63. 
 85 See Brian Tierney, Natural Law and Natural Rights, in CHRISTIANITY AND LAW: AN 
INTRODUCTION, supra note 2, at 89, 91 (discussing Romans 2).   
 86 Matthew 5:6–7; see also CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 1965, at 477 
(1994) (“The New Law or the Law of the Gospel is the perfection here on earth of 
the divine law, natural and revealed.  It is the work of Christ and is expressed particu-
larly in the Sermon on the Mount.”).  
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ly Christians meant when they said that Christ had come to fulfill the 
law,
87
 that Christ constituted the law’s end, or telos.
88
  Christ had re-
vealed Torah’s inner dimension; if they believed in Him, Christ 
would give his followers grace to follow His “new commandment” to 
“love one another.”
89
  “[T]he one who loves another,” Paul wrote, 
“has fulfilled the law.”
90
 
Now, “love one another” does not provide much practical legal 
guidance.
91
  The early Christians recognized this fact but apparently 
did not think such guidance important.  They believed that the tem-
poral world was quickly passing away; the point was not to achieve jus-
tice on earth but to prepare for eternity, which would arrive very 
soon.
92
  Thus, where the Quran announces detailed rules about inhe-
ritance,
93
 the Gospels recount that Jesus declined to resolve an inhe-
ritance dispute for one of his followers.
94
  Dividing an estate correctly 
was not important, but the condition of one’s soul, which God would 
soon judge.  Paul reprimanded early Christians for bringing lawsuits 
against one another, particularly in Roman courts where pagan 
judges presided.  Christians should resolve disputes among them-
selves.  Indeed, why were Christians demanding their legal rights at 
all?  “Why not rather be wronged?” Paul asked.
95
  “Why not rather be 
defrauded?”
96
 
As the apostolic age ended, and Christians realized that they 
were not living in the last generation but would need some sort of 
temporal arrangements, they started to engage law in a more serious 
way.
97
  Practically, they began to formulate canons—the word comes 
 
 87 See Matthew 5:17. 
 88 Romans 10:4; see also Johnson, supra note 79, at 63.   
 89 John 13:34.   
 90 Romans 13:8. 
 91 See Johnson, supra note 79, at 63–64. 
 92 Cf. HANS KÜNG, ISLAM: PAST, PRESENT & FUTURE 581–83 (John Bowden trans., 
2007) (“The original Christian community . . . lived in expectation of the imminent 
return of the Lord . . . and consequently were uninterested in establishing structures 
of worldly power.”). 
 93 THE MEANING OF THE HOLY QUR’AN 4:11-14, at 186-88 (‘Abdullah Yusuf ‘Ali 
trans., 11th ed. 2004).  
 94 Luke 12:13–15. 
 95 1 Corinthians 6:7. 
 96 Id.   
 97 See Ladislas M. Örsy, Theology and Canon Law, in NEW COMMENTARY ON THE 
CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 21, at 1, 7 (noting that early Christian assemblies 
realized that “they had to create ordered structures and converging operations if 
they wanted to exist at all”).  
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from the Greek for “straight rod’” or “measuring stick”—regarding 
church structure and discipline.
98
  The canons developed episodical-
ly; they tended to be brief and ad hoc.
99
  Christians collected them in 
informal handbooks like the first century Didache, “which established 
rules governing the liturgy, the sacraments and lay practices such as 
fasting.”
100
  For centuries, various unofficial collections circulated 
throughout the Christian world.
101
  Christians did not regard any of 
these collections as complete or universally applicable; Christians evi-
dently did not think they required such a collection.
102
  Indeed, the 
first serious attempt to systematize the canons occurred relatively late, 
during the so-called Papal Revolution (1050–1200), roughly one 
thousand years after Christianity’s founding.
103
 
Virtually all Christian traditions have some form of canon law, 
but they value it differently.
104
  Catholicism has been most enthusias-
tic.  Medieval Catholicism, in particular, developed a reticulated ca-
non law system that extended beyond worship and church discipline 
to cover social relations.  So, for example, there was a medieval canon 
law of crimes, contracts, inheritance, property, and torts, all of which 
derived, in theory, from the church’s authority over the sacraments.
105
  
Medieval Catholicism also professionalized the ecclesiastical courts.  
These courts had existed since late antiquity; in the fifth century, Au-
gustine had bemoaned the time his judicial tasks took away from his 
other episcopal responsibilities.
106
  But ecclesiastical courts always had 
been somewhat informal.
107
  The medieval Papacy regularized their 
 
 98 HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 199 (1983) (“measuring stick”); Ken-
neth Pennington, The Growth of Church Law, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF 
CHRISTIANITY 386, 390 (Augustine Casiday & Frederick W. Norris eds., 2007) 
(“straight rod”).  
 99 See R.H. Helmholz, Western Canon Law, in CHRISTIANITY AND LAW: AN 
INTRODUCTION, supra note 2, at 71, 72–73; Johnson, supra note 79, at 64. 
 100 Pennington, supra note 98, at 387. 
 101 See R.C. MORTIMER, WESTERN CANON LAW 12–15 (1953).  
 102 See BERMAN, supra note 98, at 199–200; Helmholz, supra note 99, at 73–74.   
 103 See BERMAN, supra note 98, at 115–19, 202. 
 104 See Helmholz, supra note 99, at 72. 
 105 BERMAN, supra note 98, at 225; John Witte, Jr., Introduction to CHRISTIANITY AND 
LAW: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 2, at 1, 10–11. 
 106 See John C. Lamoreaux, Episcopal Courts in Late Antiquity, 3 J. EARLY CHRISTIAN 
STUD. 143, 144–46 (1995); Noel E. Lenski, Evidence for the Audientia episcopalis in the 
New Letters of Augustine, in LAW, SOCIETY, AND AUTHORITY IN LATE ANTIQUITY 83, 93 
(Ralph W. Mathisen ed., 2001). 
 107 See Helmholz, supra note 99, at 74.  
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operation and theorized their jurisdiction as part of a new “constitu-
tional” order of the church.
108
 
Other Christian traditions have been less positive about canon 
law.  Protestants have been the most suspicious.  As Witte explains, 
the Reformers believed that “medieval Catholic canon law obstructed 
the individual’s relationship with God and obscured simple biblical 
norms for right living.”
109
  Luther burned canon law books,
110
 and 
Protestant countries gradually transferred the jurisdiction of eccle-
siastical authorities to state officials.
111
  Protestants did not abolish ca-
non law entirely, however, and most denominations continue to em-
ploy some form today.
112
  Orthodoxy has canons, but it views them 
more as “pastoral texts” than “juridical norms,” guides to handling 
specific spiritual problems, not prescriptions for conduct.
113
  It allows 
“ample scope” for “economy,” the relaxing of canons in particular 
cases in order to further a person’s spiritual development.
114
  Ortho-
doxy has never produced a universal code of canons.
115
  While some 
contemporary Orthodox writers favor codification, others argue that 
it would contradict Orthodoxy’s mystical essence.
116
 
Christianity also has engaged law philosophically, as a matter of 
jurisprudence.  Over centuries, it has developed subtle and varied ty-
pologies of law.  The Church Fathers taught that there were three 
kinds of law: natural law, accessible to human reason; Mosaic Law, 
contained in the Old Testament; and the law of Christ, revealed in 
the Gospels.
117
  In the ninth century, Nestorian Christians came up 
with a slightly different taxonomy: the divine law of Christ, “beyond 
reason and nature”; the “law of nature, based on reason, innate in 
man’s mind”; and the satanic “law of violence,” which opposed both 
 
 108 See BERMAN, supra note 98, at 221–24, 530. 
 109 Witte, supra note 105, at 16. 
 110 Id.; see Helmholz, supra note 99, at 83. 
 111 See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, II, at 6 (2003); Witte, supra note 
105, at 16.   
 112 Cf. Doe, supra note 13, at 271 (mentioning Protestant churches that have ca-
non law). 
 113 LEWIS J. PATSAVOS, SPIRITUAL DIMENSIONS OF THE HOLY CANONS 21–22 (2003). 
 114 Doe, supra note 13, at 285; see PATSAVOS, supra note 113, at 12–13.   
 115 See Paul Valliere, Introduction to the Modern Orthodox Tradition, in 1 THE 
TEACHINGS OF MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE, supra 
note 2, at 503, 518. 
 116 See PATSAVOS, supra note 113, at 8–9.  
 117 See BRAGUE, supra note 61, at 212. 
MOVSESIAN (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/28/2010  2:04 PM 
2010] FIQH AND CANONS 875 
 
God and nature.
118
  Christian legal theorists have argued for centuries 
about the overlap among the different categories as well as the re-
spective roles of reason and revelation in discovering them.
119
 
As with canon law, Christian traditions have valued jurispru-
dence differently.  Western Christianity has been more enthusiastic, 
with Catholicism showing the most interest in systematic legal philos-
ophy.
120
  Aquinas provides the best example; with the rise of neo-
Thomism since the nineteenth century, systematic legal thought has 
experienced a renaissance in Catholic circles.
121
  Protestantism has 
viewed jurisprudence somewhat more skeptically, but it has made im-
portant contributions too.
122
  For example, Melanchthon developed 
an influential theory of law’s “three uses”—promoting “external . . . 
morality,” revealing God’s wrath against sin and sinner, and educat-
ing the faithful
123
—which his contemporary, Calvin, adopted in his 
own Institutes.
124
  More recent Protestant jurisprudential thinkers in-
clude Barth, Kuyper, and Niebuhr.
125
  Of the three main traditions, 
Orthodoxy has had the least interest in systematic jurisprudence, re-
flecting, perhaps, its suspicion of scholasticism and greater stress on 
mystical apprehension of divine reality.
126
 
Fiqh and canon law are subtle and complex subjects, and space 
has allowed only a brief discussion here.  This overview, however, al-
lows one to make some observations about the place law has in Islam 
 
 118 See Anton Tien, The Apology of Al-Kindi, in THE EARLY CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM 
DIALOGUE 381, 449 (N.A. Newman ed., 1993).  For more on Nestorian jurisprudence, 
see BRAGUE, supra note 61, at 214. 
 119 See, e.g., Angela C. Carmella, A Catholic View of Law and Justice, in CHRISTIAN 
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 2, at 255, 261–62 (contrasting Catholic 
and Protestant thought); Tierney, supra note 85, at 91 (noting tensions in Christian 
conceptions of natural law). 
 120 See, e.g., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 86, §§ 1949–1986, at 
473–81. 
 121 For a good introduction to Aquinas, see ST. THOMAS AQUINAS: THE TREATISE ON 
LAW (R.J. Henle ed. & trans., 1993).  For a good introduction to neo-Thomism, see 
Russell Hittinger, Introduction to Modern Catholicism, in 1 THE TEACHINGS OF MODERN 
CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE, supra note 2, at 3.  
 122 See, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 111, at 6–10 (discussing Lutheran and Calvinist 
jurisprudence). 
 123 FROM IRENAEUS TO GROTIUS: A SOURCEBOOK IN CHRISTIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT, 
supra note 14, at 651. 
 124 See id. at 664. 
 125 See Mark A. Noll, Introduction to Modern Protestantism, in 1 THE TEACHINGS OF 
MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE, supra note 2, at 261, 
282. 
 126 See Valliere, supra note 115, at 506 (discussing but qualifying this observation).  
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and Christianity.  First, the historical development of Islamic law dif-
fers greatly from the analogous process in Christianity.  Recall that 
the ulama began to systematize fiqh quite early; the process was basi-
cally complete within two or three centuries of the Prophet, when the 
ulama decided that the “door of ijtihad” had closed.
127
  By contrast, 
Christianity existed for one thousand years before any Christians—
and only Christians in the West—thought to assemble the canons in-
to a comprehensive and universally applicable collection.
128
  This dif-
ference alone suggests how much more important legal system build-
ing has been to the Muslim, as opposed to the Christian, religious 
experience. 
Second, fiqh and canon law have dramatically different scopes.  
Classical fiqh covers “almost every conceivable arena of social life,”
129
 
including how to comport and groom oneself, how to pray, what to 
eat, how to conduct business and make contracts, how to buy and sell 
real property, whom to marry, how to divorce, and how to divide 
one’s estate.
130
  Indeed, because fiqh’s scope is so extensive, in the 
classical conception, “all” practicing “Muslims need[] . . . at least 
some rudimentary understanding of it.”
131
  Muslims can gain this un-
derstanding on their own, but the more typical method is to consult a 
member of the ulama for a legal opinion, or fatwa.  A fatwa does not 
bind (or excuse) a believer,
132
 but it can be influential, particularly if 
the issuing jurist has a reputation for insight and integrity.  The ulama 
thus function as Islam’s clergy; as in Judaism, religious lawyers are the 
authorities to whom the community turns for guidance in daily life.
133
 
Canon law, by contrast, has a much more limited compass.
134
  It 
deals overwhelmingly with matters of church administration rather 
than personal behavior and moral judgment.
135
  As a result, most 
Christians have comparatively little contact with it in their daily lives.  
 
 127 See supra text accompanying notes 70–73. 
 128 See supra text accompanying note 103. 
 129 BERKEY, supra note 72, at 143. 
 130 See, e.g., id.  (discussing topics covered by classical fiqh); KAMALI, supra note 9 
(same).  
 131 BERKEY, supra note 72, at 143.  Some contemporary Muslim scholars argue that 
much of classical fiqh should be rethought.  See infra text accompanying notes 198–
212. 
 132 See AN-NA‘IM, supra note 2, at 16. 
 133 See PETERS, supra note 5, at 176–77.  
 134 See BRAGUE, supra note 61, at 145. 
 135 See JAMES A. CORIDEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CANON LAW 4 (rev. ed. 2004). 
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As I have explained, medieval Catholicism apparently did have a 
comprehensive body of canon law.
136
  One should not exaggerate, 
however, the degree to which medieval system building represents 
something central in Christian thought.
137
  Even at the time, impor-
tant voices protested.  Around 1150, for example, Bernard of Clair-
vaux warned Pope Eugenius not to pay attention to the lawsuits clog-
ging the papal courts.
138
  “[I]t is unworthy for you to be involved in 
such affairs,” he wrote, “since you are occupied by more important”—
that is, spiritual—“matters.”
139
  And, as I have explained, Protestant 
and Orthodox Christians never shared medieval Catholicism’s enthu-
siasm for canon law. 
Moreover, notwithstanding the medieval situation, contempo-
rary Catholicism shows little interest in legal system building.  The 
current Code of Canon Law, adopted in 1983, eschews any notion of 
a general Christian substantive law.  The largest sections deal with 
questions of worship and discipline, such as the ordination and rank 
of clergy and the reception of sacraments.
140
  “In respect to most legal 
matters regulated by civil law,” the current Code “says nothing.”
141
  
Indeed, the Code frequently adopts civil law by reference in a process 
called canonization.
142
  As long as civil law doctrines do not violate 
principles of “divine law”—the law drawn directly from revelation or 
natural law—the Code typically defers to them in areas like contracts, 
employment, inheritance, and torts.
143
  Augustine would be pleased: 
Church trials nowadays are reserved “almost exclusively for marriage 
annulment cases,” Christians having decided that Paul’s admonition 
against secular litigation no longer applies.
144
 
Third, the functions of classical fiqh and canon law differ greatly.  
Fiqh operates as a crucial link between Muslims and God.  Recall that 
 
 136 See supra text accompanying notes 105–108. 
 137 Cf. Helmholz, supra note 99, at 71–72 (discussing continuing controversy over 
canon law in Christian history).  
 138 FROM IRENAEUS TO GROTIUS: A SOURCEBOOK IN CHRISTIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT, 
supra note 14, at 269. 
 139 Id. at 270–71; see also BERMAN, supra note 98, at 196 (discussing Bernard’s views 
regarding the papal courts). 
 140 CORIDEN, supra note 135, at 42. 
 141 Huels, supra note 22, at 85. 
 142 See 1983 CODE c.22 (Canon Law) (“Civil laws to which the law of the Church 
defers should be observed in canon law with the same effects, insofar as they are not 
contrary to divine law and unless it is provided otherwise in canon law.”).  
 143 On the definition of “divine law,” see CORIDEN, supra note 135, at 36. 
 144 Paprocki, supra note 21, at 1803; see CORIDEN, supra note 135, at 194. 
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the goal of classical ijtihad is to ascertain the will of the Legislator, 
that is, God.
145
  The ulama reason out what God has ordained; in the 
final analysis, believers comply because God commands it.
146
  Canon 
law, by contrast, has an auxiliary function.  In John Coughlin’s 
phrase, canon law “point[s] beyond itself”;
147
 it works indirectly, by 
supporting other aspects of Christian life.
148
  For example, by creating 
an orderly internal structure, canon law allows the church to adminis-
ter the sacraments and accomplish its evangelical mission.
149
  Similar-
ly, canon law educates believers and aids their spiritual growth.
150
  In 
short, canon law is facilitative, not constitutive, of the believer’s rela-
tionship with God.  Canon law honors God,
151
 but it does not re-
spond, the way fiqh does, to a divine command. 
Fourth, canon law has a contingent quality that classical fiqh 
lacks.  Because canon law exists to help the church on earth to 
achieve its mission, and because the church on earth remains subject 
to time and circumstance, canon law must have the capacity to 
adapt.
152
  This does not mean that canon law is entirely malleable; the 
belief that divine law does not change places a limit on canon law’s 
elasticity.
153
  “The vast majority of canons” do not embody divine law, 
however, and can evolve.
154
  For example, rules on clerical celibacy in 
the Catholic Church have varied from time to time and place to 
place.  Before the medieval Papal Revolution, parish priests in the 
Latin rite could marry; afterwards, they could not.
155
  In Eastern rites, 
parish priests may still marry.
156
  This capacity for change distinguish-
 
 145 See supra text accompanying notes 59–60. 
 146 See supra text accompanying notes 59–67. 
 147 John J. Coughlin, Canon Law and the Human Person, 19 J.L. & RELIGION 1, 47 
(2003). 
 148 See CORIDEN, supra note 135, at 5–6 (describing functions of canon law). 
 149 See Örsy, supra note 97, at 2–3. 
 150 See PATSAVOS, supra note 113, at 4–5, 21; Doe, supra note 13, at 281. 
 151 See Örsy, supra note 97, at 3 (“When the people intelligently and freely give 
themselves to [Christ’s] Church and observe its laws, they honor him.”). 
 152 See id. at 2; cf. BERMAN, supra note 98, at 202–03 (discussing Western canon 
law’s understanding of law as evolving). 
 153 See Huels, supra note 22, at 56 (“Divine laws, given by God, are unchangeable 
by human beings.”).  Canons that seek to embody divine law may be somewhat con-
tingent, however.  Örsy, supra note 97, at 2.  
 154 CORIDEN, supra note 135, at 36. 
 155 See BERMAN, supra note 98, at 95.  For the current rule on clerical celibacy, see 
1983 CODE c.277 § 1 (Canon Law). 
 156 See John E. Lynch, The Obligations and Rights of Clerics, in NEW COMMENTARY ON 
THE CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 21, at 343, 356 n.68. 
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es canon law from fiqh, which—in the classical conception, at least—
achieved perfection many centuries ago and cannot develop further. 
Finally, Islamic and Christian jurisprudence differ in basic orien-
tation.  Fiqh is an exegetical exercise, an attempt to deduce concrete 
rules from scriptural sources.
157
  It generally does not concern itself 
with defining the nature of justice or the human responsibility for 
moral reasoning.  Islam does not lack interest in such questions, but 
it has tended to channel them to a different discipline called kalam, 
or “discourse,” a fascinating subject I lack space to address.
158
  Chris-
tian jurisprudence, by contrast, is not exegetical.  It is a kind of spe-
culative legal philosophy, addressing the interplay between reason 
and faith and the capacity to apprehend the moral law without spe-
cial revelation.
159
  Christianity’s interest in speculative legal reasoning 
dates from the religion’s formative period.
160
  The Pauline epistles, 
the earliest Christian scriptures, themselves speak of natural law, a set 
of moral principles “written on [the] hearts” of all people, even 
“Gentiles.”
161
  Historian Patricia Crone nicely captures the distinction 
between the Islamic and Christian approaches in discussing how the 
two religions would address the use of religious images, or icons.  
“[I]n the legal culture of Islam,” she writes, the question would be, 
“‘when precisely are images permitted?’”
162
  In the more “philosophi-
cal culture of Christianity,” by contrast, the question would be, “‘what 
precisely is the nature of an image?’”
163
 
*  *  * 
The different emphasis on religious law is reflected in contem-
porary Muslim and Christian attitudes toward religious tribunals.  In 
countries where they constitute minority communities, some influen-
tial Muslim organizations have sought to establish Islamic law tribun-
als to resolve family and commercial disputes among consenting Mus-
 
 157 Cf. BRAGUE, supra note 61, at 145 (noting that canon law “does not put into op-
eration an exegetical method comparable to” Islamic law). 
 158 See ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 69; WEISS, supra note 56, at 25–30.  For an argu-
ment that kalam represents the most important discipline in Islam, see Mohammad 
Fadel, The True, the Good and the Reasonable: The Theological and Ethical Roots of Public 
Reason in Islamic Law, 21 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 5, 31 (2008). 
 159 See, e.g., Carmella, supra note 119, at 261–62. 
 160 See Tierney, supra note 85, at 89–91. 
 161 Romans 2:14–15.  
 162 Patricia Crone, Islam, Judeo-Christianity and Byzantine Iconoclasm, 2 JERUSALEM 
STUDIES IN ARABIC AND ISLAM 59, 83 (1980). 
 163 Id. 
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lims.  These organizations contend that Muslims require such tribun-
als, whose rulings would bind parties in civil courts, in order to prac-
tice their faith.  Two recent controversies, one in Canada and the 
other in Great Britain, illustrate the phenomenon. 
In 2003, the Canadian Society of Muslims announced its inten-
tion to establish a Muslim Court of Arbitration in Ontario to resolve 
family disputes.
164
  The Society planned to operate the tribunal under 
Ontario’s Arbitration Act, which allows binding family-law arbitra-
tion.
165
  The tribunal was to resolve only those disputes that Muslims 
voluntarily referred to it and decide cases according to “Muslim Per-
sonal/Family Law.”
166
  Such a tribunal was necessary, the Society ex-
plained, because Canadian Muslims “live in a non-Muslim country 
which subjects us to laws which, for the most part, do not allow us to 
live our faith to the best of our ability.”
167
 
News of the tribunal sparked immediate resistance, with most 
opponents expressing concern about the potential oppression of 
women.
168
  The outcry did not diminish when a government report 
recommended allowing Islamic family law arbitration, with some sa-
feguards.
169
  The report explained that religious organizations, includ-
ing at least one Muslim group, had been conducting dispute settle-
ment in Canada for years,
170
 thereby helping “people of faith . . . to 
live . . . according to their beliefs.”
171
  In response to the outcry, On-
tario’s Premier announced a ban on all religious arbitration,
172
 but 
the province eventually took a more nuanced position.  As of 2007, 
 
 164 See Caryn Litt Wolfe, Note, Faith-Based Arbitration: Friend or Foe? An Evaluation of 
Religious Arbitration Systems and Their Interaction with Secular Courts, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
427, 448 (2006).  For the Institute’s Web site, see The Islamic Institute of Civil Jus-
tice—the Muslim Court of Arbitration, http://muslim-canada.org/ 
DARLQADAMSHAH1.html (last visited May 19, 2010).  
 165 See Shachar, supra note 18, at 577. 
 166 See Interview by Rabia Mills with Syed Mumtaz Ali, President, Can. Soc’y of 
Muslims (Aug. 1995), available at http://muslim-canada.org/pfl.htm. 
 167 Id.  
 168 See MARION BOYD, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW: PROTECTING CHOICE, 
PROMOTING INCLUSION 48, 52 (2004), available at 
http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/fullreport.pdf; 
see also Wolfe, supra note 164, at 448–49 (discussing this concern). 
 169 BOYD, supra note 168, at 133.  For example, the report recommended numer-
ous steps to ensure that people’s consent to religious arbitration was informed and 
voluntary.  Id. at 133–42. 
 170 Id. at 55–60. 
 171 Id. at 63 (discussing submissions from advocates of religious arbitration). 
 172 Wolfe, supra note 164, at 449. 
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Ontario had decided to allow religious organizations to arbitrate fam-
ily disputes, but only under secular law.
173
 
The British controversy began in 2008, when the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, Rowan Williams, gave an address in which he advocated 
a formal role for Islamic tribunals.
174
  In a pluralistic society, Williams 
argued, a supplementary role for voluntary Islamic arbitration, par-
ticularly in family and commercial disputes, seemed unavoidable.
175
  
Otherwise, a “secular legal monopoly” would overwhelm citizens’ re-
ligious commitments.
176
  Williams emphasized that Islamic tribunals 
could not be allowed to deny Muslim citizens their civil rights and 
pointed out that Christian and Jewish tribunals traditionally had 
shared jurisdiction with civil courts in Britain without creating dire 
consequences.
177
  Critics excoriated Williams,
178
 but the Lord Chief 
Justice endorsed his position.
179
  By autumn 2008, reports surfaced 
that the government was advising Muslim groups that civil courts 
could enforce Islamic arbitration awards under the English Arbitra-
tion Act.
180
 
One such organization, the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT), 
would like to test the government’s theory.  MAT runs Islamic tribun-
 
 173 Ann Laquer Estin, Unofficial Family Law, 94 IOWA L. REV. 449, 469 & n.91 
(2009). 
 174 Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, Foundation Lecture at the Royal 
Courts of Justice: Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious Perspective (Feb. 7, 
2008) (transcript available at http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1575). 
 175 Id.  
 176 Id. 
 177 See id.; see also Interview by Christopher Landau, BBC World at One, with Ro-
wan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury (Feb. 7, 2008), available at 
http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1573 (discussing Orthodox Jewish tribun-
als).   
 178 One newspaper characterized the reaction to Williams’s speech as “the most 
serious threat to the authority of his office since he became Archbishop.”  Ruth 
Gledhill & Joanna Sugden, Archbishop of Canterbury ‘Should Resign’ over Sharia Row, 
TIMES ONLINE (London), Feb. 8, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/ 
article3335026.ece. 
 179 Lord Phillips, Lord Chief Justice of Eng. & Wales, Equality Before the Law 8–9 
(July 3, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.matribunal.com/downloads/ 
LCJ_speech.pdf). 
 180 See Abul Taher, Revealed: UK’s First Official Sharia Courts, SUNDAY TIMES (Lon-
don), Sept. 14, 2008, at 2, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/ 
crime/article4749183.ece; cf. David G. Green, Introduction to DENIS MACEOIN, SHARIA 
LAW OR ‘ONE LAW FOR ALL?’ 1, 3-4 (2009) (discussing assertion by British Govern-
ment minister that “sharia rulings on family matters . . . could be given the authority 
of a British court”). 
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als in London, Birmingham, and Manchester.
181
  Although informal 
Islamic arbitration has existed in Britain for decades, the organiza-
tion’s Web site proclaims that it “will . . . for the first time, offer the 
Muslim community a real and true opportunity to settle disputes in 
accordance with Islamic Sacred Law with the knowledge that the out-
come as determined by MAT will be binding and enforceable.”
182
  
MAT advertises its services primarily in family disputes, but it also 
handles commercial, debt, inheritance, and mosque disputes.
183
  MAT 
acknowledges that civil law binds citizens but states that Islamic law 
also “[has] its place in this society” as “our personal and religious 
law.”
184
  “What a great achievement it will be,” its Web site proclaims, 
“if we can produce a result to the satisfaction of both English and Is-
lamic law!”
185
 
Some Canadian and British Muslims have vociferously opposed 
the creation of these Islamic arbitration regimes.
186
  And it is true that 
the tribunals would cover only certain aspects of fiqh—primarily fami-
ly and commercial law—not its entirety.  Still, the apparent level of 
support for Islamic arbitration contrasts dramatically with the lack of 
interest contemporary Christianity shows in religious law and tribun-
als.  Recall that ecclesiastical courts tend to be reserved nowadays for 
internal church matters and, in some cases, marriage annulments.
187
  
The vast majority of Christians would never think to use them for lay 
legal disputes.
188
  Moreover, although some Christian organizations 
 
 181 See Green, supra note 180, at 2–3. For the organization’s Web site, see Muslim 
Arbitration Tribunal, http://www.matribunal.com/ (last visited May 19, 2010).  
 182 Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, supra note 181. 
 183 Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, Our Cases, http://www.matribunal.com/ 
cases.html. 
 184 Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, Values and Equalities of MAT, 
http://www.matribunal.com/values.html. 
 185 Id. 
 186 On Canadian Muslim opposition, see Jehan Aslam, Note, Judicial Oversight of 
Islamic Family Law Arbitration in Ontario: Ensuring Meaningful Consent and Promoting 
Multicultural Citizenship, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 841, 842 (2006); Wolfe, supra 
note 164, at 449.  On British Muslim opposition, see Sameer Ahmed, Recent Develop-
ments: Pluralism in British Islamic Reasoning: The Problem with Recognizing Islamic Law in 
the United Kingdom, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 491, 491, 495–96 (2008).  For a recent critique 
of Islamic arbitration from a Muslim perspective, see An-Na‘im, supra note 19, at 27–
28. 
 187 See supra text accompanying note 144. 
 188 Cf. Paprocki, supra note 21, at 1804 (explaining that “most Christians today are 
more likely to sue a fellow Christian in civil court . . . than to bring an action . . . in a 
[church] tribunal”).  
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do offer arbitration services, “Christian arbitration” entails a search 
for ethical resolutions to legal disputes, not an application of Chris-
tian law. 
Peacemaker Ministries, a prominent Christian dispute-
settlement organization, offers a good illustration.
189
  The group was 
established “in 1982 by a group of pastors, lawyers, and business 
people who wanted to encourage and assist Christians to respond to 
conflict biblically.”
190
  In addition to informal dispute-settlement me-
chanisms like mediation, the group offers arbitration through its “In-
stitute for Christian Conciliation.”
191
  The Institute’s rules make clear 
that arbitrators do not resolve disputes according to some sort of 
Christian law.  Rather, arbitrators apply secular law, subject to broad 
biblical principles like keeping one’s word and acting justly and mer-
cifully.
192
  The rules also state that “arbitrators may grant any remedy 
or relief that they deem scriptural, just and equitable, and within the 
scope of the agreement of the parties.”
193
  In essence, the service that 
Peacemaker Ministries provides resembles what commercial arbitra-
tors know as “ex aequo et bono” decision making—the resolution of 
legal disputes according to the broad equitable discretion of the arbi-
trator rather than formal legal analysis.
194
 
I recognize that factors beyond internal religious dynamics may 
help explain why contemporary Muslims and Christians place a dif-
ferent value on religious tribunals.  For decades, sociologists have dis-
cussed the “secularization theory,” which holds that modernity leads 
inexorably to a decrease in religious commitment.
195
  Perhaps this 
theory explains the contemporary lack of interest in Christian law.  
 
 189 See Grossman, supra note 20, at 177–78 (describing Peacemaker Ministries). 
 190 Peacemaker Ministries, First Visit? Please Read This, 
http://www.peacemaker.net/site/c.aqKFLTOBIpH/b.937085/k.A1EB/First_Visit_Pl
ease_Read_This.htm (last visited May 19, 2010).  
 191 Grossman, supra note 20, at 178. 
 192 See Peacemaker Ministries, FAQ’s Regarding Christian Conciliation: An Intro-
duction to Christian Conciliation, http://www.peacemaker.net/site/ 
c.aqKFLTOBIpH/b.3910013/k.93FC/FAQs_Regarding_Christian_Conciliation.htm 
(last visited May 19, 2010). 
 193 See The Inst. for Christian Conciliation, Rules of Procedure, 
http://www.peacemaker.net/site/c.nuIWL7MOJtE/b.5378801/k.D71A/Rules_of_Pr
ocedure.htm (Rule 40(B)) (last visited June 21, 2010).  
 194 See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 43, 127–28 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing equitable arbitra-
tion).  
 195 See Mark C. Modak-Truran, Secularization, Legal Indeterminacy, and Habermas’s 
Discourse Theory of Law, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 73, 79–80 (2007). 
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That Christians today do not wish to settle disputes according to reli-
gious law may reflect more a decline in religious intensity than law’s 
place in Christianity.
196
  Islam today is approximately the same age 
Christianity was at the time of the Renaissance.  Perhaps Muslims’ re-
ligious intensity will also decrease over time, and Muslims come to see 
fiqh as less important to their daily lives.  Indeed, advances in scientif-
ic knowledge and technology since the Western Enlightenment 
might accelerate the secularization process.
197
  Voltaire had to rely on 
the printing press; his successors can use the Internet. 
Secularization may already have begun.  The fact that proposals 
for religious tribunals relate only to some areas, not the whole of fiqh, 
suggests that even those Muslims who desire Islamic law do not desire 
it in its entirety.  Moreover, some contemporary Muslim thinkers 
question the relevance of the classical, law-based model for Western 
Muslims.  Many of these thinkers reject the “closing of the door” and 
seek to open a new era of ijtihad.
198
  For example, Tariq Ramadan ar-
gues that Islam represents a faith, not a culture or civilization.
199
  He 
maintains that Islam requires Western Muslims to participate whole-
heartedly in the social and political life of their countries, to be good 
citizens who “submit to the body of positive law,”
200
 as long as that law 
does not violate Islamic conscience.
201
  Ramadan thinks that conflicts 
will be “limited.”
202
  On a true interpretation of Islam, he argues, one 
that avoids the “distorting prism” of the conventional model, Western 
laws should not pose major barriers to Muslim life.
203
  In most situa-
tions, jurists should be able to find solutions to allow Muslims to prac-
tice their faith and abide by secular law.
204
 
Khaled Abou El Fadl likewise rejects as “Orientalist” and “essen-
tialist” the notion that Islam and Islamic law are “one and the 
 
 196 Cf. Witte & Alexander, supra note 32, at xxxiv (observing that “the legal struc-
ture and sophistication of the modern Christian church as a whole is a pale shadow 
of what went on before”).  
 197 See John O. McGinnis, The Symbiosis of Constitutionalism and Technology, 25 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 3, 12 (2001) (observing that “[s]cientific discovery and technologi-
cal progress seem to have been generally correlated with a decline in religious 
faith”). 
 198 See, e.g., AN-NA‘IM, supra note 2, at 15; Khan, supra note 2, at 343.   
 199 See RAMADAN, supra note 34, at 79, 214. 
 200 Id. at 95. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. at 100; see also id. at 95 (“very rare”). 
 203 Id. at 100. 
 204 See id. at 100–01.  
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same.”
205
  Although many observers believe that Muslims must comply 
with the totality of Islamic law wherever they are—a belief that would 
make life in a non-Muslim country practically impossible—not all 
Muslim jurists agree.
206
  Muslims must have the ability to practice Is-
lam, but that does not necessarily mean following classical fiqh in 
every context.  For example, Abou El Fadl points out, the twentieth-
century Egyptian jurist Rashid Rida maintained that Muslims in a 
non-Muslim country need follow “only . . . the laws pertaining to acts 
of worship (‘ibadat) such as fasting, almsgiving, and praying.”
207
  In 
other areas, like commercial and criminal law, Muslims could follow 
the secular laws of the host country.
208
 
Finally, Abdullahi An-Na‘im argues that Islamic law should never 
be enforced by the state, either in those countries where Muslims 
make up a majority of the population or in those countries where 
Muslims form minority communities.
209
  For him, Islamic law must be 
a matter of voluntary compliance on the part of the believer.  “Islamic 
law is always relevant and binding on Muslims,” he writes, “but only as 
each Muslim believes it to be and not as declared and coercively en-
forced by the state.”
210
  In the minority-Muslim context, this means 
that Muslims must avoid involving the state in Islamic arbitration.
211
  If 
the state enforces Islamic arbitral awards, he believes, that will inevit-
ably corrupt fiqh; “the outcome will always be state law on its own 
terms.”
212
  State enforcement creates the risk that Muslims will comply 
with rulings, not out of honest religious conviction, but because civil 
courts have ordered them to do so.  
 It is hard for an outsider to evaluate this debate within Islam.  
Notwithstanding some signs of an “Islamic Reformation,”
213
 though, 
 
 205 Khaled Abou El Fadl, Striking a Balance: Islamic Legal Discourse on Muslim Minori-
ties, in MUSLIMS ON THE AMERICANIZATION PATH? 47, 60–61 (Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad 
& John L. Esposito eds., 2000). 
 206 See id. at 57; Khaled Abou El Fadl, Legal Debates on Muslim Minorities: Between Re-
jection and Accommodation,  22 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 127, 151–53 (1994) (discussing di-
versity of opinion among pre-modern and contemporary jurists). 
 207 Abou El Fadl, supra note 205, at 54.   
 208 Id.  
 209 An-Na‘im, supra note 19, at 2.  For An-Na‘im’s more extensive development of 
his position, see AN-NA‘IM, supra note 2.  
 210 An-Na‘im, supra note 19, at 3. 
 211 See id. at 26–28. 
 212 Id. at 27. 
 213 The phrase is An-Na‘im’s.  ABDULLAHI AHMED AN- NA‘IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC 
REFORMATION (1990). 
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one should resist assuming that modernity will inevitably change Is-
lam.  Observers have begun to question the power of the seculariza-
tion theory generally; despite the confident forecasts of a generation 
or two ago, religion does not seem to be in terminal, global decline.
214
  
With respect to minority-Muslim communities, specifically, traditional 
expressions disproportionately attract younger, Western-born Mus-
lims with university degrees and a familiarity with contemporary cul-
ture—the very people to whom, presumably, secularism would appeal 
most.
215
  Although progressive Islamic scholarship is important, it of-
ten encounters resistance in Muslim communities.  Ramadan, for ex-
ample, concedes that his ideas “are frightening and . . . appear new 
and ‘offensive’” to many Muslims;
216
 the title of his most recent work, 
Radical Reform, suggests the degree of change he believes necessary.
217
  
An-Na‘im writes that his views “are not only controversial, but also 
psychologically and intellectually difficult for the vast majority of 
Muslims to accept today.”
218
 
Another factor that may explain Western Muslims’ interest in re-
ligious tribunals is Muslims’ status as a minority community.  Muslims 
have only recently begun to arrive in significant numbers;
219
 like most 
immigrants, many of them find comfort in traditional ways.
220
  Moreo-
ver, Muslims may find aspects of Western law and courts to be alien 
and unfamiliar, the reflections of a different religious history and 
sensibility.
221
  As the dominant religious group in Western society, 
Christians fail to perceive the ways in which their worldview pervades 
the judicial system; values that appear neutral and unremarkable to 
Christians may not seem so to Muslims.
222
  Finally, Western Muslims 
 
 214 See, e.g., Thomas F. Farr & William L. Saunders, Jr., The Bush Administration and 
America’s International Religious Freedom Policy, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 949, 967–68 
(2009). 
 215 See CHRISTOPHER CALDWELL, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN EUROPE: 
IMMIGRATION, ISLAM, AND THE WEST 156–58, 234 (2009). 
 216 RAMADAN, supra note 34, at 5. 
 217 RAMADAN, supra note 17. 
 218 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, Religion, the State, and Constitutionalism in Islamic 
and Comparative Perspectives, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 829, 843 (2009). 
 219 See RUTHVEN, supra note 4, at 353 (discussing Muslim migration to the West in 
recent decades). 
 220 See BOYD, supra note 168, at 46. 
 221 Cf. RAMADAN, supra note 34, at 99 (noting that “[t]he laws of Western countries 
have been thought out and elaborated for a society from which Muslims were ab-
sent”).  
 222 See BOYD, supra note 168, at 46. 
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who experience social prejudice may seek solidarity in an expression 
of group difference.
223
  In short, the fact that many Western Muslims 
propose Islamic tribunals may reflect an assertion of communal iden-
tity more than the centrality of law in the Islamic tradition. 
Christians often do fail to perceive the ways in which their values 
continue to influence Western law, even considering the major secu-
larizing impact of the Enlightenment.
224
  Even so, the argument that 
one should see proposals for Islamic tribunals as reflecting commun-
al identity rather than religious conviction misses the point.  Of 
course Muslims who advocate Islamic tribunals are asserting their 
identity.  Religious conviction and communal identity often intert-
wine; identity is how religious conviction expresses itself in human 
communities.  The key point is that many Muslims express their iden-
tity through a demand for law.  Other similarly situated groups do 
not.  Increasing numbers of Buddhists, Hindus, and Sikhs also have 
immigrated to Western countries in recent decades, yet no compara-
ble movement for Buddhist, Hindu, or Sikh tribunals has emerged.
225
  
So far, these communities have been content to rely on Western legal 
institutions even though those institutions have Christian antece-
dents, and presumably express some Christian values, that the com-
munities do not share. 
*  *  * 
This Essay represents a beginning.  Much comparative work on 
Islamic and Christian jurisprudence remains to be done.  For exam-
ple, what impact, if any, has each religion had on the other’s under-
standing of law?  How have Islamic and Christian jurisprudence in-
fluenced the ways that Muslims and Christians conceive the state and 
its proper relationship to believers?  What implications do Muslim 
and Christian theories have for contemporary concepts of religious 
freedom and other human rights?  These questions will have to await 
another day.  For now, I hope that I have shed some light on the 
complex and different ways that Muslims and Christians understand 
 
 223 Cf. RAMADAN, supra note 34, at 6–7 (alleging that Western Muslims live with so-
cial “Islamophobia” on a daily basis). 
 224 See Witte, supra note 105, at 28–30 (discussing Christianity’s impact on current 
law). 
 225 But cf. John Witte, Jr., Exploring the Frontiers of Law, Religion, and Family Life, 58 
EMORY L.J. 87, 93 (2008) (observing that “Muslims, Hindus, and other religious mi-
norities are now pressing for equal treatment for their systems of religious arbitration 
of marriage and family disputes”).  
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law, and how these complexities and differences inform an important 
contemporary debate. 
